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• • • J
It is well known that the first welfare theorem fails for the pure exchange^overlapping
generations economy studied by Samuelson (1958) and for the private production overlapping
generations economy studied by Diamond (1965). Tirole (1985) combines and extends the
Samuelson and Diamond frameworks by permitting both unsecured debt and private pro
duction and shows that the first welfare theorem still fails to hold. This paper shows that the
reason for this failure is that intermediation is niodelled as a purely passive coordination ac
tivity implemented by a Walrasian Auctioneer. When intermediation is instead modelled as a
contestable activity carried out by a corporate intermediaryownedby consumer-shareholders
and operated in their interest, every equilibrium must by Pareto'efficient. In broader terms,
these findings caution that the inefficiency observed in standard modellings of overlapping
generations economies may not be the reflection of an intrinsic market failure, as is often
claimed. Rather, the observed inefficiency could instead be due to a fundamental incom
pleteness in themodel specification—the presumed inability ofprivate agents to exploit the
earnings opportunities associated with incurring and forever rolling over debt.
KEYWORDS Intermediation, overlapping generations, Pareto efficiency, produc
tion, unsecured debt, bubbles.
*This paper is based in part on Pingle and Tesfatsion (1991b). The authors are
grateful to H. Quirmbach for helpful comments. Please address correspondence to Leigh
Tesfatsion, Department of Economics, ISU, Ames, lA, 50011-1070.
1. Introduction
Tirole (1985) studies an overlapping generations economy in which agents can issue
consumption loans, as in Samuelson (1958), and can also engage in private goods produc
tion as in Diamond (1965, pp. 1130-1135). In particular, the savings ofeach generation can
be used in part to finance the capital investment of firms and in part to finance the con
sumption of agents whose consumption demands are in excess of their endowments. Tirole
shows that the resulting economy fails to satisfy the first welfare theorem. Specifically, as
reviewed in Section 2, below, two stationary competitive equilibria exist for this economy:
a Pareto inefficient equilibrium with no consumption loans; and a Pareto efficient "golden
rule" equilibrium in which consumption loans are made.
This paper suggests that the failure of the Tirole economy to satisfy the first welfare
theorem can be attributed to the passive role assigned to intermediation.^ The only inter
mediary in the Tirole economy is an implicitly present Walrasian Auctioneer concerned with
coordination but not with optimization. As detailed in Section 3, below, private agents in
Tirole economy do not exploit viable and profitable debt issue opportunities.
To explore this point further, the Tirole economy is generahzed in Section 4 to include
the explicit presence of a corporate intermediary owned by consumer-shareholders.^ The
efficiency properties exhibited by the resulting "Brokered Economy" then depend on the ex
act modelling ofthe intermediary's objective. One possibility is that the Brokered Economy
intermediary behaves as aWalrasian Auctioneer, i.e., as a pnce-setting agent concerned only
with trade and credit coordination. In Section 5.A it is shown that the Brokered Economy
reduces to the Tirole economy in this case.
Another possibility, however, is that the intermediary moves beyond mere coordination
and acts in the interests ofits shareholders. In Section 5.B we retain the assumption that the
intermediary is a price setter, but we also assume the intermediation market is contestable.
^In Pingle and Tesfatsion (1991a) it is shown that passive intermediation is the root cause of Pareto
inefficiency problems for Samuelson's (1958) pure exchange economy, a special case ofthe Tirole economy.
^Bernanke and Gertler (1986) also introduce intermediaries ("banks" or "insider investment coalitions")
into an overlapping generations model. However, they focus on the potential role of these intermediaries in
reducing deadweight losses due toprincipal-agent problems inthe loan market for investment projects. They
do not permit intermediaries to issue consumption loans. The closest forerunner to the present paper appears
to be E. Thompson (1967). Thompson argues that genuinely perfect competition requires the introduction
of a market for private debt instruments (e.g., a corporate pension fund), a market omitted from models
such as Samuelson (1958).
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That is, we assume that entry occurs-when an entrant can feasibly assume the liabilities of
the existing corporate intermediary and can strictly increase the dividends paid to its current
shareholders. We assume that the existing corporate intermediary sets its stock share prices
so as to prevent the entry of any competitors, and we extend the standard definition of an
equilibrium to include this corporate intermediary objective. Under these assumptions, we
show that every Brokered Economy equilibrium.is Pareto efficient.
The crucial fact used to establish this Brokered Economy first welfare theorem is that
entry into the intermediation market is feasible only if a certain price condition fails to
hold. This price condition is analogous to the well-known Cass-Bala^sko-Shell transversality
condition shown by Balasko and Shell (1980) to, be necessary- for Pareto efficiency in the
context of a pure exchange overlapping generations economy. Our findings thus suggest an
economic interpretation for this transversality condition as a constraint on the price-setting
behavior of an optimizing corporate intermediary in a contestable intermediation market.
Overall, our findings suggest that the Pareto inefficiency exhibited by commonly used
models of dynamic open-ended economies with finite-lived agents can, to a large extent, be
accounted for by the fact that intermediation is^modeled as a purely passive coordination
activity. As demonstrated here for the Tirole economy, this inefficiency may be ameliorated
or even eliminated if intermediation is more realistically modeled as an activity oriented
toward the exploitation of available profit opportunities.
2. The Tirole Economy
A. Basic Model Structure
As depicted in Figure 1, the model of an economy developed by Tirole (1985)—
hereafter referred to as the "Tirole Economy"—is an overlapping generations economy in
which each consumer lives for just two periods, "youth" and "old age." The generation of
consumers born at the beginning of period t consists of Li consumers and is referred to as
generation t. Population grows at the rate ^ 0, so that Lt^\ = 1-f- Lt. The economy
begins in period 1with jCq > 0old consumers of generation 0 and Li = [1 n]Lo young
consumers of generation'1.
(
— Insert Figure 1 About Here —
The Tirole Economy has a single physical resource which may either be consumed or
used in production as capital. Adopting the conventional time dating of goods, the resource
during period t will be referred to as "good t." Each young consumer in each generation
^—1 inelastically supplies one unit of labor in return for a real (resource) wage Wt. Wage
income is used by young consumers to provide young-age consumption cj and savings s^.
Old-age consumption is provided entirely from savings and accumulated interest; old
consumers do not work.
Consumer saving is held in two possible forms: units of capital; and units' of a bubble
asset that pays no dividends.^ The bubble asset can be thought of as vouchers representing
real purchasing power—for example, as real money balances, or as a credit or debit held
on account with an intermediary. If capital and the bubble asset are both to be held in
competitive equilibrium, the bubble asset must bear the same yield as capital. Thus, it is
assumed that saving in either form has a common rate of return over each period i > 1.
Consumers have identical preferences. The objective ofeach generation t young consumer
is tomaximize his lifetime utility C(+i), where U(•) has the usual curvature properties.^
Given any 1/;^ > 0 and rt^i > —1, the problem faced by this young consumer takes the form
(1) max[/(cj,c^^i)
with respect to (5(,cJ,c^^i) subject to the budget and nonnegativity constraints
cj =Wt-St ]
^i+i = [1 + rt+i]st ;
^0, ^ 0 •
Let the solution to this problem be denoted by
(2) a:(u;t,r(+i) = (3(u;,,r(+i),c^(u;(,rt+i),c^(uj(,n+i)) .
^An asset is said to exhibit a "bubble" at time i if its price at time t differs from its fundamental value,
determined as the present value of its current and future dividends. A "bubble asset" is any asset on which
a bubble may form. When an asset pays no dividends, it necessarily exhibits a bubble whenever its price
is positive. Tirole (1985) does not incorporate a market for stock shares into his model, hence bubbles on
capital holdings are not considered.
^Specifically, it is assumed that £/(•) is twice continuously differentiable, strictly increasing, and strictly
quasi-concave, with ?/(0,c?^.i) = C^(c},0) = (7(0,0).
Each old consumer in the initial period 1 receives a payment [i + ri]so of principal plus
interest, where the savings level satisfies $q —s{wo,ri) and the savings function 5(')
coincides with the savings function determined for each generation t > 1 agent in (2). The
consumption of each old consumer in period 1 is therefore cj = [1 + ri]5(iyo,ri).
Output in the Tirole Economy is produced at,the beginning of each period by a firm
that uses capital and labor inputs in accordance with the production relation K = F{K,L).
The production function F{') is assumed to exhibit constant returns to scale, and to satisfy
the usual continuity and curvature restrictions.® Letting k = K/L and y = Y/L denote the
capital-labor ratio and the output-labor ratio, respectively, the production relation can be
expressed in per-capita (i.e., per-worker) form as y = F{k^ 1) = f{k).
In each period <> 1 the firm must pay the wage rate Wt to each unit of employed labor
as well as a rental rate for'each unit ofemployed capital. The rental rate on capital in period
t is assumed to be the same as the interest rate on savings. The price-taking firm selects
levels of'capital and labor inputs to maximize profits. Formally, the firm's problem may be
stated as " ' '
(3) max [F(k^L) —rtK ~ WtL .
A'>o,L>o^ V » y t t j
hi order for a positive vector (Kt,Lt) of capital and labor inputs to solve problem (3), it is
both necessary and sufficient that the capital-labor ratio kt = Kt/Lt satisfy
(4) r, = /'(i,) ;
(5) w, = - f'(k,)k .
Conditions (4) and (5) generate the well-known "factor-price frontier" relationship be
tween the wage rate Wt and the interest rate For any given interest rate > 0, let
denote the capital-labor ratio kt that uniquely satisfies condition (4). Substituting k{rt) into
condition (5), the wage rate Wt that satisfies condition (5) is then uniquely determined as a
strictly decreasing function of the interest rate rt.
In each period / > 1 the supply of capital consists of aggregate savings St~^i = Lt-iSt-i
less that part of savings held in the form of the bubble asset. Let denote
®More precisely, the following restrictions are imposed on F{-): twice continuous differentiability and
strict concavity over the positive orthant with F(0,0) = 0, Fk > 0, Fl > 0, and Fkk < 0; continuity
over the nonnegative orthant Rl; and, for each L>0, Fk{1<, L)^OasK^ -\-6o and Fk{K, L)~^+ooas
aggregate bubble asset holdings and Kt denote the firm's aggregate demand for capital.
Then, in per capita terms, supply equals demand® in the capital market when
(^) [^(-1 ~ ^(-1, / 1+ n = kt .
As in Tirole (1985, p. 1503), the following restriction is imposed on the growth of the
aggregate bubble asset holdings Bt:
0) Bt = [!-{- rt]Bt-i ,
or, in per-capita terms,
(®) k = [(1 + rt)/{l H- n)]6(_i .
The implications of restriction (7) are examined in Section 3, below.
Young consumers in each period i > 1 supply labor inelastically, in total amount Lt.
Supply equals demand in the labor market when the firm chooses to employ this labor
supply. As in Tirole (1985), it is assumed that supply equals demand in the labor market in
each period i, so that Lt denotes the period t work force as well as the period t population
of young consumers.
Since capital in the Tirole Economy does not depreciate, the total supply of product
available in each period i is Vj + Kt. The total demand for product includes capital demand
for the following period, Kt+i, and aggregate consumption for the current period, Ltc] +
Lt-ic^. In per capita terms, supply equals demand in the product market for period t when
(^) 2/i + —[1 + ^t+i H" Cj -f c^/[l -f- n
Finally, following Tirole (1985), the economy is initialized by assuming that the capital-
labor ratio ko > 0 and the per capita bubble asset holdings ^ 0 ^.re exogenously given.
The capital-labor ratio ko in turn determines the initial interest rate tq and the initial wage
®In the standard Arrow-Debreu general equilibrium model with nonsatiated consumers, market clearing
conditions typically only require that supply be at least as great as demand in quantity terms. Walras' law
then implies that any good in excess supply must have a zero price. However, as detailed in Pingle and
Tesfatsion (1994), Walras' law need not hold in overlapping generations models without unsecured debt.
Consequently,, market clearing conditions have traditionally been stated in a stronger form requiring directly
that supply equal demand in each market in real value terms. See, for example, Diamond (1965), Gale
(1973), Balasko and Shell (1980), Tirole (1985), and Azariadis (1993, Chapter 13).
rate 1^0 in accordance with the'marginal productivity-conditions -
(10) •• . , . : • TO'^/W'; •• - •
(11) • - • ' •• • Wo = fiko)-f'{ko)ko . ' '•'' • '
The Tirole Economy can then be reduced to-a pair of difference equations in the "state
variables" kt and bt over times i > 1,
(12) [1 + n]kt = s - r(kt-i)ki_i, /'(A:^) - bt-i ;
(13) ' " • ht ={[lVf:{kt)]/ll-\-n])bt.r',
starting from the exogenously determined initial values ko and bo.
B. Competitive Equilibrium and Efficiency ' • >"
As in Tirole (1985), a competitive equilibrium will now be defined for the Tirole
Economy in terms of optimality conditions for the consumers and the' firm, the capital
market clearing condition, and the growth restriction on bubble asset holdings, all,in per
capita formJ
DEFINITION 1'[Tirole Equilibrium |: 'Given initial values ko > 0 and 6o > 0 for
capital and bubble asset holdings, a sequence (3^, cj,c^, 6^, ly/: t >1) ofsavings levels
St, consumption levels cj and c^,- poMtive capital-labor ratios kt, per capita bubble asset
levels bt, interest rates rt > 0; and wage rates Wt > 0 is a competitive equilibriuni
®(^Oj&o) for the per capita Tirole Economy if and only if it satisfies the following four
conditions:
TGiven consumer and firm optimizatioii and the capital market clearing" condition (6), the bubble asset
growth restriction (8) is equivalent to the product market clearing conditi9n (9)., To see this, consider the
following sequence of implications in both the forward and reverse directions:
» - . ' ' ' 'i *
(1 + n)fct+i+cj + C(/[l + n] = yt-\-kt;
• '• (1 + + [u't - S(]V [i'+r(]si_i/(l+ n] - yt+ht\
(1 + ")^(+i' + [u'i —Si] + [1 + r(]st_i/[l + n] = + [1 -f rt]kt;
, , (f +'?)^I+1 — [1 n]5|_i/[l + n] = [l + r(] '^t;
(1 + n)A;(+i - [6( + [1 + + [1 + + [1 + n] '^(]/[l + n] = [1 + nl^fj
/. I M I _ IL i n—+ [1 + rj]6t_i/[l + n] = 0.
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^Firm Optimization] Conditions (4) and (5) hold for each t > 0.
Consumer Optimization In each "period t > 1, the young consumer's choice
vector Xi = solves the lifetime utility maximization problem (1)
conditional on Wf and i.e., Xt = x[wt^rt+i); and each old consumer in period 1
consumes cj = [1 + njso with So = s{f{ko) - /'( '^o)^o, n)-
Capital Market Clearing] In each period i > Ij condition (6) holds.
Bubble Asset Growth Restriction] In each period t > 1, per capita bubble asset
holdings grow in accordance with condition (8).
A competitive equilibrium ^[kQ, bo) for the Tirole Economy will be called stationary if
kt = ko and bt = 6o for each period t > I.
Tirole (1985) assumes that there exists a unique r satisfying 5(u7(f),f) = [1 -f- n]jt(f),
with 0 < f < n. Also, as detailed in Section A of the Appendix, several additional technical
regularity conditions are imposed on the savings function s(-) and the production function
/(•). Given these regularity conditions, the Tirole Economy has two distinct stationary
competitive equihbria: a Pareto inefficient equilibrium characterized by the interest rate r =
f and zero bubble asset holdings; and a Pareto efficient golden rule equilibrium characterized
by the interest rate r = n and positive bubble asset holdings.
Given the stationary interest rate r = f, the optimal consumer and firm choice variables
and the wage rate are stationary and are given by x= a:(uj(f), f), k= k{f); and w= w[f). It
is easily established that the sequence e(^,0) = u) : f > 1) satisfies the conditions
inDefinition 1 characterizing a stationary competitive equilibrium. Hereafter this bubbleless
stationary competitive equifibrium will be abbreviated by e.
The allocation achieved under the bubbleless stationary equilibrium e is not Pareto ef
ficient. Since f < n, a suitably small reduction in the equilibrium capital-labor ratio k in
any given period t\ offset by a corresponding increase in bubble asset holdings, permits an
increased stationary level of net output y ~ nk \n all periods t > t'. This in turn implies
that young and old age per-capita consumptions can also be increased in all periods t > t'\
see condition (9).
Given the stationary interest rater = n, the optimal consumer and firm choice variables
and the wage rate take on the.stationary yalu^ a;" = a;(i£;(n),n), = ^(n), and w" = w(ri).
Bubble asset holdings are then given by 6" = 5(tt;(n),n) —[1 + n]/:(n). 'Although the sign
of 6" is not expHcitly determined by Tirole (1985), itican be shown that 6" is positive.® It
is then easily verified that the sequence (x", : < > 1) satisfies all
of the conditions in Definition 1 characterizing a stationary competitive equilibrium. The
allocation generated under e(A:", 6") is the Pareto efficient allocation yielding maximum net
output p—nk in each period t > 1. 'Hereafter the equilibrium e"(A:", 6") will be abbreviated
bye".
Tirole (1985, Prop.' l, p. 1504, and Prop. 2j p.1507) provides a complete characterization
of the stability and efficiency properties of the Tirole Economy under the assumption that
r < n. Specifically, given any initial capital-labor ratio ko > 0^ he shows that there exists a
maximum feasible value'6(^o) for the initial bubble asset holdings bo sucH that the following
two results are true. First, given the initial conditions (/:o, 6(A:o)), there exists a unique
competitive equilibrium e(A;o,6(fco)); this equilibrium is'Pareto efficient, and it converges to
the Pareto efficient golden rulestationary equilibrium e". Second, given the initial conditions
(^o)^o) for a,ny bo satisfying 0 < 6o < K^o)' there exists a unique competitive equilibrium
g(^O)^o); this equihbrium is Pareto inefficient,' aiid it converges to the Pareto inefficient
bubbleless stationary equilibrium e. These properties'are schematically depicted in Figure
2, a reproduction of Figure 1 in Tirole (1985, p. 1505).
—Insert Figure 2 About Here— '
In general, ofcourse, Pareto inefficiency of a stationary equilibrium does not necessarily
imply that any equilibrium converging to this stationary equilibrium must itself be Pareto
inefficient. Consider, for example, the Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans one-sector neoclassical op
timal growth model with a positive social discount rate and aii infinite time horizon (see,
e.g., Blanchard and Fischer (1989, Fig. 2.2, p. 46)). To each positive initial capital-labor
ratio there corresponds a unique optimal (hence'Pareto efficient) growth path; but this opti
mal growth path converges to a stationary equilibrium that is strictly Pareto-dominated by
the golden-rule stationary equilibrium. For the Tirole Economy, however, each equilibrium
®Since the proof is not entirely straightforward, it is given in.Section Aof the Appendix.
e(,fco5 &o) with 0< 60 < b{ko) is Pareto inefficient because it is characterized by capital over-
accumulation in every period—cf. Tirole (1985, Fig. 1, p. 1505). Asuitably small increase in
the bubble asset holdings bi_i offset by a decrease in the capital labor ratio kt in any period
t permits an increase in the period t net output yt —nkt+i and hence also in the per capita
consumptions for the young and old consumers in all periods f > i.
3. Passive Mediation in the Tirole Economy
The Tirole Economy does not include an explicit intermediating institution. Never
theless, it is still possible to consider production and intermediation as distinct functions.
Production is the transformation of capital and labor inputs into output. Intermediation
matches agents who have demands with suppliers who can meet those demands. Here, at
tention will be focused on the intermediation of demands and supplies for savings, and the
term "intermediary" will be used as a short-hand for the implicit agency that mediates
savings activities in the Tirole Economy.
TheTirole Economy differs from the economy modelled by Dianaond (1965) in one crucial
respect: Themarket clearing condition for capital is relaxed to allow for consumption loans,
i.e., intergenerational transfers ofgoods that permit some agents to consume more than their
current endowments. Specifically, as depicted in Figure 1, the Diamond market clearing
condition St = Kt+i is replaced by the condition St = Bt Kt+i- From the viewpoint of
period t young consumers, Bt represents the portion of their savings held in the form of
a bubble asset. From the viewpoint of the intermediary, Bt represents the portion of his
deposits not invested in capital. The intermediary is thus potentially able to use Bt to
enhance the consumption of generation t ~ 1 old consumers.
More precisely, the incoming receipts of the Tirole intermediary in period t consist of the
savings deposits St received from young consumers and the repayment [l-\-rt]Kt of principal
plus interest received from the firm for capital borrowed in period ^—1. On the other hand,
the intermediary is obliged to pay [1 -|- TfJS't-i of principal plus interest to generation t —1
old consumers and to provide the firm's demand for capital, Kt+i- The net receipts received
by the intermediary in period t are therefore given by
(14) lit = 4- [1 + rt\Kt - [1 + r(]5i_i - Kt+i
— —^^t+i] —[1 + —Kt
= - [1 . • • '
• » ^ ' '
Comparing (14) with the restriction (7) imposed by Tirole on.the growth of the bubble
asset holdings Bt, the latter restriction appears in a new light. Specifically, restriction (7)
forces the intermediary's net receipts (14) _to be zero in every period i ^ 1. In imposing
condition (7), Tirole (1985, p. 1503) correctly notes that physical capital and the bubble
• I • ' Sv I - '
asset must earn the same yield in order for both assets to be held in equilibrium. The
equahty of these yields, however, does not imply that restriction .(7) must hold. Rather,
restriction (7) holds if and only if an additional special-case restriction is invoked: namely,
the bubble asset remains in fixed supply. ^
To see this, let denote thequantity of the bubble asset supplied by the intermediary
inperiod t—1,and let denote theprice ofthe bubble asset during period t—1measured
in units ofgood i —1. Because the bubble, asset is used exclusively to finance consuinption
loans, it follows that 5/_i = For the bubble asset to be held at the same time
capital loans are being made, the bubble asset must earn the same rate ofreturn as capital,
meaning that = [1 + Gonsequently;-the following sequence of equalities must
hold in the forward and reverse directions:
(15) .n, = -Bi-[l.-fr,]B(_i • -
= ~ [1 +
= ' ~ ©t-l] •
As condition (15) makes clear, whether or not Tirole's restriction (7) holds, and hence
whether or not the interrnediary has nonzero net receipts, depends upon whether or not the
supply of the bubble asset is fixed.
As shown in Section 2 (Footnote 7), Tirole's restriction (7) is equivalent to the restriction
that supply exactly equals, demand in the product market. Thus^ if restriction (7) need not
hold, product market clearing in, this strong form need not hold either (cf. Footnote 6). In
fact, the intermediary s ability to achieve positive net receipts depends upon his ability to
generate an excess supply in the product market. When there is an excess demand in the
product market, Bf is strictly less than [1and the intermediary's net receipts Ht are
negative. This situation cannot arise in competitive equihbrium because the intermediary
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is unable to fulfill all contractual obligations. In contrast, when there is an excess supply in
the product market, i.e., when Bt is strictly greater than [1 + the intermediary's net
receipts are positive. In this case, the intermediary can meet all contractual obHgations and
then keep the remaining excess supply.
In short, once the assumption of a fixed bubble asset supply is relaxed, it is possible for
the intermediary to obtain ownership over a positive quantity of the economy's resources by
increasing the supply of the bubble asset. With this opportunity present, is it reasonable to
suppose that the coordination of trade and credit transactions remains the intermediary's
sole objective? If not, the intermediary's stance toward accumulating net receipts must be
clarified in order for the model of the economy to be complete.
The next section sets out a generalization ofthe Tirole Economy that explicitly includes
a corporate intermediary with an objective that goes beyond passive coordination. In partic
ular, the intermediary is not required to keep the bubble asset in fixed supply. Theefficiency
implications of assuming this more active form of intermediation are explored in Section 5.
4. The Brokered Economy
Consider an extension of the Tirole Economy, hereafter referred to as the "Brokered
Economy," in which all savings activities are explicitly mediated by a single intermediary.
Consumers have the opportunity to purchase two assets from the intermediary: namely,
bonds; and shares of stock in the intermediary. There are no risk differences between bonds
and stock shares, so that consumers base their asset choices only upon expected rate of
return.
Each young consumer in generation t > 1 demands Xf bonds and Of shares of stock, to
be sold in the subsequent period. The period t prices of bonds and stock shares in terms
of good t are and p^, t > and are taken as given by consumers. The intermediary
distributes dividends to its consumer-shareholders in accordance with the following dividend
policy: Each share of stock purchased during period t entitles the owner to a per share
dividend in period t
Let dt+i denote the per share dividend expected by each young consumer in generation t
> 1. The utility maximization probleni of this price-taking young consumer then takes the
11
form ^
(16) , , maxi7(cj,c?+i)
with respect to A^,0^) subject to the budget and nonnegativity constraints
c] = Wt~p^X^~pX ;
^?+i = Pt+i^t ;
Cf > 0, ^ 0 .
The utiUty function appearing in (16) is assumed to be the same as described in Section 2
for the Tirole Economy.
No sign restrictions are placed on Af or implying that short sales are allowed for both
bonds and stock shares. Consequently, assuming all prices are positive, no finite solution
exists for problem (16) unless bonds and stock shares yield a common positive gross rate of
return, i.e., unless
Pt+i/Pt = \Pt+i'^ '^ t+i]/pt = [l+n+i
for some r^+i > —I.
Given positive prices, together with the viability condition (17), it is straightforward to
show that the utility maximization problem (16) faced by each generation t young consumer
in the Brokered Economy can equivalently be expressed in form (1), i.e., in the same form
as the utility maximization problem faced by each generation t young consumer in the
Tirole Economy. Consequently, as for the Tirole Economy, an optimal solution exists for
the consumers planned savings level St = [cj —Wf] and consuniption levels (cjjc^^j) as a
function of the wage Wt and the cbnmion rate of return . Hereafter this optimal solution
will be denoted by®
(5K)n+i),c^(u^(,rt+i),c^(u7(,ri+i)) .
^Recalling the definitions for the factor-price frontier functions u)(r) and k{r) given in Section 2.A, it will
be ^sumed here as for the Tirole Economy that there exists aunique f satisfying s(u;(f), f) =' [1 +n]k(f),
with r < n. Also, as noted in Section 2.B, Tirole (1985) imposes several additional technical regularity
conditions on the savings function s(-) ^d the production function /(•). These regularity conditions are
^80 ^sumed to hold for the Brokered Economy. Adetailed statement of these regularity conditions can be
found in Part A of the Appendix.
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On theother hand, the individual bond and stock share demands of each Brokered Economy
consumer are indeterminate since the consumer is indifferent among all bond and stock share
combinations that yield his optimal planned savings level.
The problem facing the firm in the Brokered Economy is identical to that facing the firm
in the Tirole Economy. In each period t >1, the profit-maximizing firm has the opportunity
to rent capital from the intermediary to be used as an input to production along with the
labor Lt supplied inelastically by young consumers. The rental capital Kf which the firm
plans to employ during period t is demanded from the intermediary during period t —1. As
for the Tirole Economy, it is assumed that the interest rate charged to the firmfor the rental
of this capital is the same as the interest rate on savings. Consequently, the firm plans to
make a payment [1 + ri\Kf ofprincipal plus interest to the intermediary in period t.
The intermediary's net receipts 11^ in period t > 1 are equal to the quantity of good i
remaining in the intermediary's possession after all ofhis contractual obligations are fulfilled
apart from dividend payments. Thesenet receipts are determined by a consideration of the
intermediary's bond, stock share, and capital transactions.
Let Aj = LfXf and denote the total amounts of bonds and stock shares which
the intermediary plans to supply to consumers in period t, and let denote the amount
of rental capital which the intermediary plans to supply to the firm for use in period t. As
a result of bond sales and purchases, the intermediary in period t plans to receive p^AJ
units of good from generation t young consumers and to dehver p^A^_i units of good t to
generation t —I old consumers. Moreover, as a result, of stock share sales and purchases,
the intermediary in period t plans to receive pfQl units of good from generation t young
consumers and to deliver units ofgood t to generation t —Xold consumers. Finally,
as a result of capital rental transactions, the intermediary in period t plans to receive a
principal-plus-interest payment [1 from the firm and deliver capital to the firm
to be employed in the subsequent period i + 1. Consequently, the intermediary's planned
period i net receipts take the form
(19) n< = - A?.i] + ptlQl - 0?_,] - [Kt+, - (1 + n)Kn ,t>l.
In the Tirole Economy, only one asset—the "bubble asset"—is used to finance consump
tion loans. In the Brokered Economy there are two assets that the intermediary could use
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to finance consumption loans: namely, bonds and stock shares.- To achieve a more direct
comparison with the Tirole Economy, it is useful tO'place the following financing restriction
on the intermediary which .ensures that stock shares in the Brokered Economy correspond
to units of bubble asset in the-Tirole,Economy:
(20) • = iq and pUQI, = B.Ji, <> 1 .
I I > I '. ' '
Specifically, restriction (20) guarantees that the intermediary finances his capital loans
solely by means of bond transactions and his consumption loans Bt~\ solely by means of
stock share transactions. Letting ht = BijLt denote per capita consumption loans, this
financing restriction in per capita terms reduces to
(21) [l + n]fcf and =''<-1, «>!.'
Given the viability condition (17) and the financing restriction (20), the intermediary's
period t net receipts (19) can be expressed as
(22) • • n, ='p'M-ei,]
= - [p?/P?-i]5,-i
= —[1 + rt]Bt-i .
By assumption, the intermediary uses these net receipts to fulfill his dividend obligations,
where dt is the period t per share dividend expected bygeneration t—1 oldshareholders,
If the intermediary's dividend obligations exhaust his net receipts, i.e., if 11^ =
then it follows from (22) that Tirole's bubble asset growth restriction (7) holds for the
Brokered Economy. In particular, (7) holds with net receipts and dividend payments both
equal to zero,if the intermediary issues no new stock shares in period:Note, however,
that (7) is not an ex ante restriction on intermediary behavior." For example, as will be
explored inSection 5.B, below, it may bethat a competing intermediary is able to successfully
enter against an existing intermediary in some period t by offering a windfall dividend to
shareholders in excess of dt which the competing intermediary finances by new stock share
issue. In this case, 11^ > dtQi_i Tirole's restriction (7) fails to hold.
To close the model, we now impose initial conditions. As for the Tirole Economy, it
is assumed that initial values fco > 0 and 6o ^ 0 for per capita capital and per capita
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consumption loans are exogenously given, and that the initial interest rate tq and wage rate
wq are determined by conditions (10) and (11).
Extending Tirole's initial conditions to recognize financial assets, it is also assumed that
each old consumer in the initial period 1 owns a positive number Aq ofbonds and a nonneg-
ative number ofstock shares, where Aq and areexogenously given. Thus, the aggregate
quantities of bonds and stock shares in existence in period 1 are Aq = XqAq and ©o = LqOq.
It is assumed throughout the remainder of the paper that AJ = Aq and 0g = Oq. Moreover,
it is assumed that = 0 if a-nd only if 6o = 0, so that a positive initial real bubble 6o exists
if and only if the price ofthe bubbly financial asset (stock shares) is positive.
The expected income of each old consumer in the initial period 1 is determined by the
sale value of his bond and stock share holdings as well as by his dividend payment
Thus, each old consumer in period 1 plans to consume
(23) Cj = PiAo +
This planned consumption is assumed to derive from an unmodelled time 0 choice problem,
of the form (16).
More precisely, it is assumed that the viability condition (17) holds for t = 0 for some rj >
0, where the initial prices Pq and p^ are taken tobe any positive values satisfying thefinancing
restriction (21). In particular, then, PqXq = [1 + n]^(ri) and PqBq = bo. Consequently, the
planned consumption of old agents in period 1 can equivalently be expressed in the form
(24) Cj = [1 + ri]5(iOo,ri) ,
where the savings function 5(-) coincides with the savings function determined for each
generation t > I agent in (18). Moreover, it follows from condition (11) and from the
previous discussion that this savings function satisfies
(25) 'S(/(/jo) ~/'(^o)^05n) = [l + ?^]^(ri) + 6o .
Given the regularity conditions imposed by Tirole (1985, p. 1502) on the curvature of the
savings function s(-) and the production function /(•) and assumed also in the present paper
(see Section 2 and Appendix A), relation (25) uniquely determines rj > 0 as a function of
ko and 6o.
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The Brokered Economy is not yet complete. An objective for the intermediary needs to'be
specified, along with market clearing conditions. In standard overlapping generations models,
these two specifications have traditionally been equated; the intermediary is assumed to be
a passive Walrasian Auctioneer concerned only with trade and credit coordination. As will
now be clarified, changing the specification of the intermediary from a passive coordinator
to an active agent motivated by net receipts has immediate and dramatic implications for
the efficient operation of the economy.
5. Modelling the Intermediary: Efficiency Implications
A. The Intermediary as a Passive Coordinator .
Suppose the Brokered Economy intermediary passively mediates savings activities in
concert with the Walrasian Auctioneer who passively mediates trades in.goods and services.
That is, the intermediary and the Walrasian Auctioneer together set prices and per share
dividends and then stand ready to mediate trades for bonds, stock shares, goods, and services
and to channel savings into capital investment and consumption loans. In particular, the
intermediary does not engage in new stock share issue. Rather, the sole objective of the
intermediary is to coordinate market transactions.
The labor, capital, and product markets for the Brokered Economy, then operate in the
same manner as in the Tirole Economy. In particular, labor is supplied inelastically to the
firm by young consumers and the firm is assumed to employ this labor. Also, in accordance
with the financing restriction (20), the intermediary engages in bond transactions with con
sumers in order to supply the capital demanded by the firm. Finally, the intermediary
distributes all net receipts back to consumer-shareholders as dividends in each period t.
Given the viabihty condition (17), it follows from (22) that the intermediary's per capita
net receipts = HtlLt in each period t >1 are given by
(26) ' TT, =
= - [p?/(H-n)pti]6e_i
= + 7i)] + 6c- [(1 + n)/(l + .
The stock shares supplied by the intermediary in period t are given by the stock shares
that generation t —1 old agents sell back to the intermediary in period i. That is, in
16
per capita terms,
(27) ei = euni + n).
Given relation (27), it follows from (26) that the net receipts of the intermediary are zero in
each period t >1.
Given zero net receipts in each period <> 1, the intermediary can feasibly make the per
share dividend payments di expected by shareholders if and only if these expected dividend
payments are zero. It then follows from (26) with dt = 0 that Tirole's state equation (13)
must hold. As previously shown in Section 2 (footnote 7), this state equation is equivalent
to product market clearing in a strong supply-equal-demand sense.
Finally, given the viabihty condition (17), the optimization problems faced by consumers
and the firm in the Brokered Economy coincide with the optimization problems faced by
consumers and the firm in the Tirole Economy once the identification St = [cj — is made
for the Brokered Economy. The specific mix" of bonds and stock shares purchased by each
consumer in the Brokered Economy is determined by the specific mix of bonds and stock
shares supplied to young consumers by theintermediary inaccordance with his capital supply
objective, subject to the restriction that the portfolio purchased by each consumer must be
equal in value to the consumer's optimally chosen savings level. In particular, for each i > 1,
the intermediary's stock share supply 6(„i = must satisfy Tirole's state equation
(12). Theonly difference from the Tirole Economy is that the instruments for achieving the
consumers' optimal savings levels are now explicitly identified as bonds and stock sheires.
For later reference, the Brokered Economy market clearing conditions for bonds, stock
shares, capital, and product are listed below in per capita form:^°
(28) P,^A? = p^Xf , t>l •
(29) pte', = ptet, <> 1;
^°As noted in Section 3, excess supply in the product market could feasibly occur in the Tirole Economy
because the intermediary could accumulate positive net receipts (positive amounts of good) which he does
not distribute back to consumers. Consequently, the supply-equal-demand equilibrium condition for the
Tirole product market is overly restrictive. In the Brokered Economy with passive intermediation, however,
it is assumed that all of the intermediary's net. receipts are distributed back to consumers in the period in
which they are accumulated. Thus, all goods produced in any period t are acquired by consumers through
wages, dividends, and net receipts from stock and bond transactions. The supply-equal-demand condition
(31) is therefore an appropriate product market clearing condition for the Brokered Economy with passive
intermediation.
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(30) ^ = kf ,t>l;
(31) yt kf = [1 + n + cj + c^ / 1+ n , t > 1 ,
In summary, when the market coordination conditions (27) through (31) are imposed on
the Brokered Economy, the resulting "Walrasian" Brokered Economy is essentially equivalent
tp the Tirole Economy.^^ In particular, every Walrasian Brokered Economy satisfies the two
Tirole state equations (12) and, (13), implying that the same paths are generated for per
capita capital kt and per capita consumption loans bt for the Brokered Economy and the
Tirole Economy if the same initial values > 0 and bo > 0 are given.
One implication of this equivalence is that the Walrasian Brokered Economy supports the
Pareto inefficient outcome e as a competitive equilibrium. Another implication is that the
intermediary impUcitly present in the Tirole Economy is a peculiarly passive agent who does
not seek out opportunities to increase the welfare of his consumer-shareholders. In particular,
as indicated by (26), the intermediary ignores the possibihty that his net receipts—paid
out as dividends to his consumer-shareholders—could potentially be increased by issuing
additional shares of stock. In contrast, real-world intermediaries generally take advantage
of the opportunity to issue additional stock shares up to the point where stock dilution is
perceived as having adverse consequences.
It will now be shown that the peissiye intermediary in period 0.is susceptible to entry
in period 1 unless bo happens by chance to be equal to b{ko); cf. Figure 2. Specifically, if
bo < b{kQ), a competitor can feasibly assume|the liabilities.of theexisting passive intermediary
while at the same time offering current shareholders a windfall dividend secured by means
of new stock issue.
B. Potential Entry by Active Intermediaries
Suppose the existing intermediary in period 1 is currently subject to government
regulations that protect its monopoly position aga;inst potential entrants. Some measure of
protection against unrestricted entry is certainly necessary, for anentering intermediary with
no liabiUties can always attract potential shareholders away from an existing intermediary
^^Specifically, any equilibrium (5j,c|,ci, t >1) for aTirole Economy with initial conditions of
the forni ko > 0 and 6o > 0 is an equilibrium sequence ofreal outcomes for aWalrasian Brokered Economy
with initial conditions of the form (fcoi-^o) > 0and (60,^0) ^ 0, and vice versa, where st = [cj —iW(] for the
Brokered Economy.
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who has liabilities resulting from the previous issue of unsecured debt. In addition, suppose
the existing intermediary is subject to a no-profit regulation and hence is currently playing
a purely passive coordination role as described in Section 5.A.
Suddenly government in period 1 decides to open up the intermediation market to permit
entry in any period t > 1 by active profit-seeking intermediaries in accordance with the
following chartering restriction: Entrance is permitted by any competitor who can assume
the liabilitiesof the existing intermediaryand offer a feasible intermediation plan under which
shareholder dividends in the entry period are increased.^^ In particular, both the existing
intermediary and potential entrants are now permitted to be active intermediaries who can
issuebonds and stock shares (bubbleasset) in the pursuit ofhigher dividendsfor shareholders
as long as all contractual obligations are met. If he wishes to retain his monopoly position,
the existing intermediary must then seek a feasible intermediation plan that will prevent
entry, and the question arises whether this preventive behavior is socially beneficial. As
will be shown, below, social welfare is unambiguously increased by this preventive behavior
unless the initially given level 6o for per capita consumption loans happens by chance to be
just at the "right" level.
The first task is to describe more concretely our modelling of an active intermediary.
Two basic possibilities can be considered: the active intermediary is a price-taker who sets
quantities; or the active intermediary is a price-setter who takes quantities as given.
The first possibility is attractive in that the consumers and the firm are already assumed
to be price-takers. Nevertheless, the original motivation for explicitly introducing the inter
mediary was to put a corporate business suit on the passive Walrasian Auctioneer in the
Tirole Economy, and this auctioneer ismost certainly a price-setter rather than a price-taker.
We thus choose to model the active intermediary as a price-setting agent who posts prices
for bonds and stock shares. Moreover, to restrict attention to the most interesting case in
which bonds and stock shares are both held in equilibrium, we further assume that these
^^Empirical findings suggest that chartering and other government-imposed restrictions currently in force
do restrict entry into U.S. financial markets [Amel and Liang (1992)]. Indeed, as noted by Kaufman (1992,
p. 296), among the requirements typically included for obtaining a commercial bank charter in the U.S. is
a demonstration that the services proposed by the applicant are needed and will not endanger the solvency
of other similar financial institutions. Our assumption that any entering intermediary must assume the
liabilities of the existing intermediary can be interpreted as a buy-out condition that prevents the insolvency
of the existing intermediary.
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posted prices are positive.
Specifically, following the decision by. government in period 1 to open up the interme
diation market, the existing now-active intermediary publicly posts a positive bond price-
sequence a positive stock share price sequence = {p\ip2-, ••')•, and a
nonnegative.pef share dividend sequence,d = •••)• The collection of sequences I =
will be referred to'as the intermediary's prospectus. • " '
Assuming entry does not occur, consumers and the firm then,solve their individual opti
mization problems conditional on the intermediary's posted prospectus. Although the price
and dividend expectations of the consumers and the firm can differ in principle from the
planned prices and dividends posted by the intermediary in his prospectus, the definition
of an equilibrium for the Brokered Economy presented below will include the requirement
that the intermediary fulfills all of his contractual obhgations. Without loss of generality,
then, we simpHfy the exposition by assuming from the start that the price and dividend
expectations of the consumers and the firm coincide with the planned prices and dividends
appearing in the intermediary's prospectus.
Roughly stated, a prospectus I is "feasible" if it enables the intermediary to fulfill all
contractual obligations. An analytical characterization of feasibility for a prospectus I will
now be developed.
First, we assume the intermediary understands that it is not feasible in the Brokered
Economy for the per capita consumer share holdings, bt — to become arbitrarily large
over time. This fact, established in Section Bofthe appendix, follows from the assumption
of diminishing marginal returns to capital and is independent of the intermediary's behavior.
Second, the intermediary would presumably recognize or discover that bonds and stock
shares must earn a common positive gross rate ofreturn ifconsumer optimization is to result
in finite demands for bonds and stock shares. Moreover, given the financing restriction (21),
it follows from the regularity conditions imposed on the production function in Section 2
that the interest rate on bond holding must be positive in each period t. We therefore
assume that the iiitermediary requires his prospectus to satisfy the viability condition (17).
In particular, then, the intermediary's prospectus implies that bonds and stock shares earn
a common interest rate > 0 in each period i > 1.
Third, once the intermediary has posted his prospectus I, he must fulfill certain con-
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tractual obligations to young consumers and the firm in each period i > 1. Specifically,
the intermediary must be able to sell bonds and stock shares to period t young consumers
at the posted, bond and stock share prices and in order to realize their savings level
objectives, and he must be able to supply the capital demanded by the period t firm at the
implied interest rate Since bonds and stock shares earn the same interest rate, however,
only the overall level of savings matters to consumers. The specific mix of bonds and stock
shares demanded by consumers is thus determined by the specific mix of bonds and stock
shares supplied by the intermediary. In particular, given the financing restriction (21), the
per capita level of consumption loans (stock share holding) is determined by the extent to
which the optimal consumer savings level exceeds the firm's optimal ca:pital demand. Con
sequently, for each i > 0, the intermediary's period t per capita consumption loans 6( = pfO^
must satisfy^^
(32) bt = b{rt,ri+i) = ^(u'(ri),n+i) - [1 +n] '^(r(+i) .
Fourth, the intermediary must fulfill his contractual obligations to old consumers in each
period t > 1. Specifically, he must redeem their bond and stock share holdings and make
per share dividend payments to them in accordance with the prices and per share dividends
posted in his prospectus. The intermediary can ensure redemption of bond and shock share
holdings at his posted prospectus prices by ensuring (32) holds for each / > 0. As will now
be shown, however, the intermediary also needs to abide by a further restriction in order to
ensure he can fulfill his dividend obhgations.
Given the viabifity condition (17), the financing restriction (21), and relation (32) for
consumption loans, it follows from (22) that the per capita net receipts of the intermediary
take the form
(33) TTi = -1^ +6(n,r(+i) - ^>1,
1 H- n 1 + n
where dt denotes the per share dividend promised to period t consumer-shareholders in the
intermediary's prospectus. Consequently, in order for the intermediary to be able to make
reality, the intermediary would have to discover the form of the function 6(r(,rt4.i) in the process of
implementing his prospectus. For this initial study, however, we make the simplifying assumption that the
intermediary knows this function.
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these dividend,payments, it must hold-that • >
(34) • • x, > t >l,
• • 1+n
or'equivalently, that •• "
(35) •, 6(ri,ri+i) rj >• 0 , i > 1 .
X Tl>
Finally, in total value terms; note that tlie intermediary can meet all of his obligations
to agents in eachi period i > 1 if and only if the intermediary's per capita net receipts 7r<
are nonnegative in each period t > 1. Relation (34), together with the assumption that
the intermediary posts positivestock share prices and nonnegative dividend payments, show
that this nohnegativity holds if 6(_i = is nonnegative for each t > I. The latter
condition is ensured by conditions (32) and (35), however, given the assumed nonnegativity
of bo = 6(ro,ri) and the positivity of rx.
In summary, a collection of sequences I = (p^,p^,d) will be said to constitute a feasible
prospectus for the intermediary if it satisfies the following three conditions: (ij The bond
and stock share prices posted in I are positive and the dividend payments posted in I are
nonnegative; (ii) I satisfies the viability condition (17) with rt+x > 0for each t > 1; and (iii)
the per capita consumption loans supplied to consumers by the intermediary, given by (32),
are uniformly bounded above and satisfy condition (35).
Given a feasible prospectus I, it follows from tile general structureof the Brokered Econ
omy set out in Section 4 that the only aspect of the prospectus that affects real outcomes
in the economy is the associated interest rate sequence (ri,r2,...). Hereafter this interest
rate sequence will be referred to as the intermediation plan associated with I, denoted by
r(I). Conversely, any interest rate sequence-r'= (ri,r2, .•.'.) with rt > 0 for all / > 1 that
satisfies condition (iii) in the definition of a feasible prospectiis will be said to be a feasible
intermediation plan for the intermediary; for any such interest rate sequence constitutes an
intermediation plan r(I). for at least one feasible prospectus 1. '^*
'^'To see this, first note that no intermediary in' period 1' has any leeway in the setting of ri or in the setting
of the associated initial prices pj and rf if existing contractual obligations are "to be fulfilled. Specifically, it
follows from condition (iii) in the definition of a feasible prospectus that ri > 0 is uniquely determined as
afunction of the exogenously given values ko and b'o by relation (32) for i = 0, which then determines pj
and Pq as well (see Section 4). To construct a feasible prospectus that supports the interest rate sequence
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Conditions have now been set out that define what it means for the existing intermediary
to view an interest rate sequence as a feasible intermediation plan. Still to be specified,
however, is the objective ofthe intermediary that determines how he will choose a particular
intermediation plan from thisfeasible set inorder toprotect himself against potential entrants
able to attract away his prospective shareholders.
It will first be shown that, relative to an existing intermediary with a feasible interme
diation plan r, a potential entrant in period t that assumes the liabilities of the existing
intermediary can feasibly increase the dividends paid out in period t if and only if he can
feasibly offer a higher interest rate rt+i.
To see this, suppose that a potential entrant offers an intermediation plan r' in some
period < > 1 as a feasible alternative to an existing intermediation plan r. As explained
above, feasibility of an intermediation plan requires the period 1 interest rate rj to satisfy
relation (32) for t = 0. As discussed in Section 4, this requirement determines a unique
positive value for rj, so potential entrants have no feasible way to change rj.
Suppose, then, that for all s < i and Given that the potential entrant
assumes the liabilities of the existing intermediary, his net receipts in period t are determined
by (33) with in place of It follows that the increase in will increase period t
net receipts relative to the net receipts of the existing intermediary—and thus provide for
the possibility of a windfall per share dividend payment to period t shareholders in excess
of their currently expected per share dividend payment dt—if and only if the consumption
loan level 6(rf,rt+i) of each period t young consumer increases with increases in r^+i; that
is, if and only if
(36) +
Condition (36) is equivalent to a condition imposed by Tirole (1985, p. 1502) on the slope
of the savings supply curve relative to the capital demand curve. As noted in Section 2
and detailed in Section Aofthe Appendix, condition (36) is one of the regularity conditions
assumed to hold throughout the present paper. Consequently, the increase in rt+i will
increase feasible dividend payments in the entry period.
r, it then suffices to let the dividend payment dt be zero for each t "> 1 and to set the bond and stock share
prices and pf for t > 1to positive values that satisfy the viability condition (17) in each period <>1 for
the given interest rate sequence.
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Conversely,,suppose for all 5 < / and < rt+j. Given (36), it is immediately
seen that dividend payments in the entry period must then decrease;
It follows as a corollary to these arguments that a potential entreint in period t who
assumes the liabilities of the existing intermediary can always offer an alternative intermedi-
ation plan r' that isfeasible through period t and that increases period t,dividends: simply let
r' coincide with the existing intermediation plan r through period t and satisfy > rt+i-
The possibility of successful entry against the existing intermediary in period t thus hinges
upon whether or not there exists an intermediation plan of this" form that is also feasible for
all periods 5 > /., If so, the existing intermediation plan r will be said to be susceptible to
entry in period t. ' ^
An intermediation plan r will be said to be optimal'-\i: (a) it is feasible; and (b) it'is not
susceptible to entry in any period t. In principle, the set of optimal intermediation plans
can bedetermined through the use of conditions (32) and (35) once values are given for the
exogenous .parameters Atq Letting i2(A;o)^o) denote this set of optimal intermediation
plans, it is assumed that the existing intermediary in period 1 selects a new intermediation
plan from the set of optimal plans in R{kQ,bQ) after the government in period 1 opens the
intermediation market to potential entrants.
Adefinition of an equilibrium will now be given for the Brokered Economy in per capita
form that includes the no-entry objective of the intermediary as well as the objectives of the
consumers and the firm.
DEFINITION 2 [Brokered Economy Equilibrium]: Let initial values (X'o,Ao) > 0
and {bo, 60) > 0for per capita capital, bonds, consumption loans,, and stock shares be given,
where bo = 0 ifand onl^ if9o = 0. Then a sequence m^, w,, : t > 1) consisting of
consumer choice vectors = (cj,c^,5(, )^f,9f), firm_ per capita capital demands kf > 0,
intermediary choice vectors m, = {rup^,pldt,kl\\,bt,6l),,_and wage rates Wt > 0 is a
Brokered Economy equilibrium 6(^0,^o»^o) if the following five conditions are met:
• [Firm Optimization] In each period t>0,rt = f'{kf) and Wt = f(kf) - f'(kf)kf,
where = ko.
i
• [Consumer Optimization] In each period t> I, the young consumer's choice vector
= r-SijcJjcJ+J solves the lifetime utility maximization problem (1), conditional on
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Wt andrt^i, i.e., x, = rj+j) = (sK, r,+i),rj+i),c2(u;„ rj+i)); and each
old consumer in period 1 consumes cj = [1 + ri]5(ii;o, ri).
• [Financing Restriction] In each period t > I, capital loans (1 + n)kl are financed
solely by means of bond transactions p^_iX\_-^ and consumption loans bt-i are
financed solely by means ofstock share transactions p^_^0^_i, where Ag = Aq; 9q = Oq,
and Pq and p^ are any positive values satisfying (1 + n)k{ = PqAq and bo = PqOq.
• [Intermediary Optimization] For each t > 0; the consumption loan level ^t=piK
equals [5(u;(r(),r^+i) —(1 + ?^)^(''t+i)] anrf the total portfolio value p^X^ + p^O^
supplied to each young consumer equals s{w{rt),rt+i), where w{r) and k{r) are the
factor-price frontier functions derived from r = f'{k) and w= f{k) —f'[k)k.
Moreover, the interest rate sequence r = (ri,r2,...) is an element of the set R{ko, bo)
of optimal intermediation plans, and the collection ofsequences I = (p^,p^,d)
constitutes a feasible prospectus that supports this optimal intermediation plan.
• [Market Clearing Conditions] In each period t '> 1, the bond, stock share, and
capital market clearing conditions (28) through (30) hold; and the product market
clears in the sense that excess supply is nonnegative}^
A Brokered Economy equilibrium e(^;o, Aq, 6o, ^o) will be called stationary if kt = ko,
Xt = Ao, bt = bo, and Ot = Oq for allt> 1.
An immediate and important implication of this equilibrium definition with active in
termediation is that the Pareto inefficient stationary equilibrium e for the Tirole Economy
cannot be supported as an equilibrium real outcome for the Brokered Economy because it
is susceptible to entry. More generally, as will be shown in Theorem 1, below, the optimiz
ing behavior of the active intermediary rules out any path for the Brokered Economy that
converges to e in real terms because all such equilibria are susceptible to entry.
^®These market clearing conditions are actually implied by the previous conditions of the definition and
are stated only for clarity. As the intermediary acts to mediate savings into investment, he also acts to
ensure the market clearing conditions for bonds, stock shcires, and capital. Moreover, nonnegative excess
supply in the product market is ensured by condition (35); cf. Section 2 (footnote 7). Positive excess product
supply canonly occur if the intermediary is able to generate net receipts in excess ofhis dividend obligations
without permitting successful entry by a competitor.
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One key observation used in the proof of Theorem 1is that the active intermediary in the
Brokered Economy, able to issue new stock shares, functions as a selection mechanism for
picking out which Tirole equilibrium path the Brokered Economy will follow in real terms.
To see this, note that the two basic state equations (12) and (13) characterizing a Tirole
Economy equilibrium are also satisfied by any Brokered Economy equilibrium once the inter-
mediary stops issuing-new .stock shares, in which case all actual dividend payments are zero.
More generally, these two state equations hold whenever the per share dividends promised
in the intermediary's prospectus absorb all ofhis net receipts, whether or not these net re
ceipts are zero and whether or not, new stock shares are issued. These claims follow from- a
consideration of the form (33) for the intermediary's per capita.net receipts. '
Another key observation used inthe proof of Theorem 1is that'the possibility of successful
entry by a competing intermediary through additional stock share issue.permits the Brokered
Economy to traverse from one Tirole equilibrium path to another if .the existing Brokered
Economy intermediary is not currently pursuing an optimal intermediation plan.
THEOREM 1: Given any value k>0 for per capita capital, let b{k) > 0 denote the max
imum feasible value for per capita consumption loans as determined for the Tirole Economy
by Tirole (1985, Prop. 1, p. 1504)}^ Then the following holds. 'Given (ko^bo) such that
0<bo< b{ko), there exists a unique optimal intermediation plan for the Brokered Economy.
Moreover, the interest rates rt that constitute this optimal intermediation plan satisfy —>• n
as t oo.
Proof. The proof of Theorem 1follows directly from simple modifications in the proof
of Proposition 1by Tirole (1985, p. 1504). ' ' ' '
Suppose, first, that 6o satisfies 0< 6o < t(^o). This initially places the Brokered Economy
at a pomt (^o, ^>0) in the (k, 6)-plane that is strictly below the locus of points {k, b) with
b= b[k), hereafter referred to as the 'Tirole sdddle path. One such point is illustrated in
Figure 2.
Given ko and 60, feasibihty''requires the existing intermediary, as well as any potential
entrant mperiod 1, to set the period 1interest'rate in accordance with relation (32) for
^~ discussed in Section 4, the latter relation determines a unique positive value rj
^®See Section 2, above.
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for Ti as a function of which in turn determines a unique positive value ki for
the period 1 level of per capita capital through the firm profit maximization condition
n = m)-
However, as detailed earlier in this section, a potential entrant in period 1 could deliver a
greater dividend to shareholders in period 1 than the existing intermediary by increasing the
period 2 interest rate r2. Condition (36) ensures that this increase in r2 moves the economy
vertically upwards from the point (ki,bi) where the economy would otherwise have been in
period 1 if the economy had simply pursued the Tirole equilibrium resulting under passive
intermediation, starting from the initial conditions {ko, bo).
If the increase in r2 results in an increase in the consumption loan level bi that is less than
^(^i)—implying that the economy is below the Tirole saddle path—this places the economy
on another feasible Tirole equilibrium path; but further entry in period 1 is still feasible. If
the,increase in r2 results in an increase in bi to the value b{ki), this places the economy on
a feasible Tirole equilibrium path—the Tirole saddle path—for which further entry is not
feasible. The reason for this is that, once on the saddle path, any attempt to offer a higher
interest rate in some period i than is currently being offered wouldmove the economy above
the Tirole saddle path and hence onto an infeasible path where the consumption loan levels
eventually explode. Finally, if the increase in results in an increase in hi to a value that lies
above b{ki), implying the economy is above theTirole saddle path, the economy immediately
moves onto an infeasible path where the consumption loan levels eventually explode, implying
the entrant's proposed intermediation plan is not feasible. These arguments directly follow
from Proposition 1 in Tirole (1985, p. 1504) and can be intuitively understood by referring
to Figure 2.
It follows from these arguments that, to protect against entry in period 1, the optimizing
intermediary should set the period 2 interest rate so that the period 1 consumption loan
level equals b[ki). Note by condition (36) that 6(fi,r2) is a strictly increasing function of
r2, hence the particular interest rate f2 that achieves 6(A:i) is a uniquely determined value.
Moreover, r2 must be positive; for, by construction, all interest rates that support Tirole
equilibria must be positive.
Similar arguments apply for protection against entry in all subsequent periods t > 2.
Consequently, to protect against entry in all periods i > 1, the optimizing intermediary
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must set the period 1 interest rate to the unique value fj > 0 that satisfies relation (32) for
< = 0 for the given initial values ko and 6o and then set the uniquely determined interest
rates r< > 0 for subsequent periods i > 2 that ensure the Brokered Economy moves along the
, A
Tirole saddle path, i.e., that ensure a consumption loan level equal to 6(^^) for all i > 1. By
construction, the consumption loan levels 6(k<) for i > 1 lie along a Tirole equilibrium path—
namely, the Tirole saddle path—and hence satisfy Tirole's bubble asset growth restriction
(8) for all t > 2. Consequently, relation (35)'holds for all t > 2 as well. Moreover, bi and bo
lie along a (different) Tirole equilibrium path and hence satisfy (8)-for't = 1 with ri = ri.
A
Since b{ki) > bi by construction, it follows that condition (35) holds for ^ = 1. The uniquely
determined positive interest rate sequence (ri,r2,r3,...) thus constitutes a unique optimal
intermediation plan in the sense defined earHer in this section.
Finally, as established by Tirole (1985, Prop. 1, p. 1505) and indicated in Figure 2, along
the Tirole saddle path the level kt for per capita capital either monotonically increases or
monotonically decreases to the golden rule level k^ = fc(?i)} implying that the interest rates
rt satisfy n as <—> oo.
If 6o = 6(A:o), it is clear from the above arguments^that the optimizing intermediary would
again set in all periods t >2 to ensure the Brokered Economy moves along the Tirole
I • ^ ' i • 1 V
Saddle path in periods <> 1. The only change from the previous case is that the value for
the period 1 interest rate rj now supports the per capita consumption loan level b{ko) on the
Tirole saddle path, implying that the Brokered Economy equilibrium path coincides with
the Tirole saddle path for all/> 0; ^
The corollary, below, demonstrates that the no-entry objective of the active Brokered
Economy intermediary is consistent with the goal ofmarket value maximization. The proof
of this corollary follows immediately from.the proof of Theorem 1.
COROLLARY 1: Given any Brokered Economy equilibrium, the market value Bt =
of the active intermediary in each period t>l is positive and takes on its maximum feasible
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value Lib(kt).
For use in the next theorem, define
(37) • 9, = , <> r,
1 + n
and
(38) Qi = ''' Qi]bo y i > 1.
Also, for each t and k satisfying t>k>l, define
(39) St,k = [QtQt-i •••Qk+i^k,
and
(40) • st,k .
fc-i
THEOREM 2: Ifr is a feasible intermediation plan for the Brokered Economy that is not
susceptible to entry, then
(41) '5't = +00 ,
t-r*+Op
and the sequence (Qt) is uniformly bounded above. Conversely, if r is a feasible intermedia
tion plan that is susceptible to entry under which stock shares are in fixed supply, then the
sequence {St) must converge and the sequence (Q^) must converge to 0.
Proof. As established in the proof for Theorem the unique intermediation plan for
the Brokered Economy that is not susceptible to entry is the plan r that follows the Tirole
saddle path for < > 1 with converging monotonically to n. Given > n as < —> oo,
however, the tail sum St—St' can be made arbitrarily large by making t sufficiently larger
than t' for some sufficiency large for in this way the terms St,k appearing in this tail sum
can be made arbitrarily close to 1. Since St> is positive for all it follows that (41) must
hold.
Also, if r is an optimal (hence feasible) intermediation plan for the Brokered Economy,
it follows by the definition of feasibility that the associated sequence (6<) of per capita
consumption loan levels must be uniformly bounded aboveand must satisfy bt > Qt for each
t > 1. The sequence (Qt) must therefore be uniformly bounded above.
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Conversely, suppose that r is an intermediation plan- susceptible to entry under which
stock shares are in fixed supply. Any feasible intermediation path for the Brokered Economy
that involves a fixed stock share supply'must satisfy the two state equations (12) and (13)
characterizing Tirole equilibria and hence must move the Brpkered Economy in real terms
along a Tirole equilibrium path. If r is susceptible to entry, however, it follows from the
proof of Theorem 1 that this Tirole equilibrium path cannot be the Tirole saddle path.
As established by Tirole (1985, Prop. 1, p. 1504), all Tirole equilibrium paths apart from
the Tirole saddle path are characterized ^by interest rates that converge to f as i > oo,
where f < n; cf. Figure'2. Consequently, any such Brokered-Economy equilibrium must be
characterized by-interest rates that ultimately converge to f, which implies that qt defined'
as in (37) converges to q = [1 + f]/[l + u] < 1. By construction, the terms Si defined in (40)
are positive terms that satisfy St = + St-i]. Given qt q'< it follows by backward
recursion that (St) is uniformly bounded, hence St must converge to q/[l —q .
Finally, if —> f as i oo, then >0 as t —> oo. •
The price condition (41) appearing in Theorem 2 is the-Brokered Economy analog of the
well-known• Cass-Balaisko-Shell transversality condition shown by B'alasko and Shell (1980,
Proposition 5.6,^ pp. 296-297) to be necessary for P^reto efficiency in a pure exchange over
lapping generations context. '^^ Balasko and Shell do not provide an economic motivation
for their transversality condition. Theorem 2 demonstrates that, for"the Brokered Economy,
condition (41) constitutes a necessary condition for the intermediary's selected intermedia
tion plan to be optimal. Moreover, in the absence of new stock share issue, it is also sufficient
for optimality.
Interestingly', given a Brokered Economy with'feo < K^o), it is feasible (but not optimal)
for an active intermediary to continually traverse across Tirole Economy equilibria with
successive new stock share issues so that bt <'b{kt) for each t > Obut n —> n as / oo.
Consequently, condition (41) holds despite thefact that theintermediation plan is susceptible
to entry in each period t >1. This is why the quahfier concerning stock share issue is needed
further analogy to Theorem 2, Balasko and Shell also show the sufficiency of this transversality
condition for Pareto efficiency if certain additional restrictions hold.
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in the sufficiency direction for Theorem 2.
THEOREM 3: There exists at least one stationary equilibrium for the Brokered Economy.
Every stationary equilibrium generates the same real outcome (s,c^ic^,k,b,r,w), where s =
—i/j]; namely, the Pareto efficient real outcome = e(P, 6") constituting the golden rule
equilibrium for the Tirole Economy. In particular, the unique stationary equilibrium .interest
rate r for the Brokered Economy is given by r ~ n.
Proof. Theorem 1 imphes that the unique optimal stationary intermediation plan r for
the Brokered Economy is given by = n for all t > 1. Consequently, the corresponding
stationary equilibrium values for per capita capital and per capita consumption loans are
given by the Tirole golden rule solution values where /'(/:") = n and 6" = 6(A:");
see Section 2. The remaining assertions of Theorem 3 are then easily verified. •
Theorem 3 demonstrates that the Pareto efficient golden rule equilibrium for the Tirole
Economy is the unique real outcome possible for the Brokered Economy in any stationary
equilibrium. In particular, the Pareto inefficient stationary equilibriume for the Tirole Econ
omy is not supported as a stationary equilibrium real outcome for the Brokered Economy.
As noted in Section 2.B, all Pareto inefficient equilibria for the Tirole Economy converge
to e; hence one might surmise that the elimination of this Pareto inefficient outcome would
lead to the restoration of a first welfare theorem. The next theorem estabhshes that this is
indeed the case.
THEOREM 4: All Brokered Economy equilibria are Pareto efficient.
Proof. As estabhshed by Tirole (1985, Prop. 1, p. 1504), the set of equilibria for the
Tirole Economycan be partitioned into two subsets: the Pareto efficient equilibria character
ized by interest rates that converge to n; and the Pareto inefficient equihbria characterized
by interest rates that converge to f < n. As shown in the proof of Theorern 1, above, the
unique optimal intermediation plan for the Brokered Economy is characterized by interest
rates converging to n, and the equilibrium paths for kt and bt that are supported by this in
termediation plan coincide for alH > 1 with the Pareto efficient Tirole Economy equilibrium
given by the Tirole saddle path. Moreover, given ko and 6o, there is no way to achieve a
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Pareto improvement of these kt and 6^.-paths without Violating the feasibility condition (32)
at ^ = 0. •
\ f , . • , ' I
To summarize, the key result'of this section is that the inefficiency observed in the Tifole
Economy is completely eliminated when intermediation is modelled as a contestable activity
carried out by a'corporate intermediary owned by'consumer-shareholders and operated in
their interest. Assuming 6o < 6(^0)?'this elimination requires the active intermediary-to
issue new stock shares' in period 1, which results in an increase'in Kis net receipts in ex
cess of his current contractual obligations. These-excess-net receipts constitute a windfall
dividend payment for the intermediary's current "shareholders, the initial generation 0 old
j I ' ' f i I 4 • '' j ' '
consumers. Interestingly, this windfall can be generated without permitting successful entry
by competitors.
These findings caution that the inefficiency observed in standard modellings of overlap
ping generations economies with production and unsecured debt may n9t be the reflection
of an intrinsic market failure. Rather, the observed inefficiency could instead be due to a
fundamental incompleteness in the model specification—the presumed inability of private
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A. Proof that 6" > 0
Tirole (1985, equ.(8), p. 1502) assumes that the equation 0 = z{r) has a unique solution
r, where •" i •• ' . •
(42) z{r) = [Lt-is{w(r)^r) —Ltk(r)\lLt = 5(t/;(r),r)/[l + n] —fc(r)"
I • J I • '
denotes the excess supply of savings per young consumer when each optimizing consumer
and producer is faced with the interest rate r. In addition, much of Tirole's analysis focuses
on the case in which inefficiency is possible, which requires f < n. As.noted in Section 2.B,
these regularity conditions are also assumed to hold in the present paper.
It will first be shown that, under these, assumptions, the excess supply of savings z{r) is
an increasing function .of r at r = f; i.e., 0 < z'{f). Using this result, it will then be shown
that
(43) 0 < z(r) for all r satisfying f < r .
•' * ' * .'
Hence, in particular, 0 < z{n) = 6"/[l + n .
Given the stationary interest rate f, producer optimization in the Tirole Economy imphes
that the capital-labor ratio k and the wage rate w satisfy f = f'(k) and w = f{k) —f'(k)k.




w'(f) =-k{fy-f"{k{fj)- k^r) = -k{f\.
Using conditions (44) and (45), one obtains
(46)
z'{f) = [5u;(i£;(f),f)iy'(f) + Sr(iy(f),f)]/[1 + n] —fe'(f)
• = '[5r(io(f),f) - 5i;;(w)(f),f)^:(f)/''(/;(r))/j'(r)]/[l + n] - k'{f)
= [5r(i«(r),f) - Sw(uj(f),f)/;(f)]/[i + n] - k'{f).
Diamond (1965, eq.(ll), p. 1133)'places a condition on the'relative slopes of the capital
market supply and demand curves along anycompetitive equilibrium path. In'particular, for
the unique stationarycompetitive equilibrium e = e(X'(r), 0) associated with' f,'this condition
reduces to • "
(47) [/"(M^))^u-(u^(r),r)]/[l-|-n-/"(^(f))sr(u'(r),r)] <0\
, I . if' ' •. 1' I ' •
Moreover, to guarantee that consumption is a normal good in each period of life for each
agent, Diamond (1965, fn. 6, pp. li31-2) assumes that 0 < < 1. The numerator in con
dition (47) is therefore negative. Thus, in order for condition (47) to hold, the denominator
must be positive; i.e..
(48) 1 + /"(^(^))5r(u^(r),r)] > 0 .
Diamond (1965, equ.(12), p. 1134) also' assumes that e is locally stable, and he gives a
condition that is necessary for this to be the case; namely,
(49) -^(r)/"(^(?'))5u;(u^(r),r)]/[l + "-/"(M^))^T-(u^(r),r)] I < 1
These same conditions are imposed by Tirole (1985, p. 1502) and are assumed to hold in the
present paper as well.
A sufficient condition for the local stability of e is that condition (49) holds with strict
inequality. This slightly stronger condition is assumed by Tirole (1985, p. 1502) and is also
assumed to hold in the present paper. Using conditions (44), (46), (48), and (49) with strict
inequality, one then obtains the following series of implications:
-A:(f)/"(fc(f))Su,(u;(f),f)] < [1 + n - f"ik{f))sr(w{f),f)
0 < [fc(f)/"(A:(f)5«,(u;(f),f) + 1+ n - f"{k{f)sr(w{f),f)
0 < [-k'{f)k(r)f"{k(f))s^{f,w{f)) - '^'(f)[l + n] + k'{f)f"(k{r))sr(w(f),f)
0 < [—fe(f)5tu(iy(f),f) —fe'(f)[l + 7l] + 5r(^^^(^))^)
0 < [Sr(ty(r),f) - ^u,(u;(r),f)A:(f)]/[l + n] —k'(f);
(50) 0 < z'{f).
As previously noted, f satisfies 0 = z[f). It follows from (50) that, for some positive e,
0 < z{r) for all r in the interval (f, f + e). Suppose that z[r^) < 0 for some r* satisfying
f + e < r*. By continuity of 2:(*), this would imply the existence of some r° lying between
f + e and r* which satisfies 0 = 2(r®), a contradiction of the assumption that there exists a
unique solution to the equation 0 = z(r).
It follows that condition (43) must hold for the Tirole Economy. •
B. Proof that bt Cannot Diverge in Any Brokered Economy Equilibrium
Along any equilibrium path for the Brokered Economy, the per capita consumption loan
levels bt supplied by the intermediary are given by relation (32), implying that bt = —(1 +
n)k<+i for each t > 0. In addition, they must satisfy condition (35) in order to guarantee
that dividend obligations can be met. Suppose the sequence (6^) diverges to infinity. Since
the historically given value 6o is nonnegative by assumption, and all equilibrium interest
rates are positive, it follows from (35) that the sequence [bt) is nonnegative. Consequently,
bt must become infinitely large as t approaches infinity.
The equilibrium savings St of each generation t young consumer must be nonnegative
and less than his endowment wt in order for the consumer to consume a nonnegative amount
of good when young and when old. Since all equilibrium interest rates are positive, the
producer optimization condition (4) implies that the equiUbrium capital-labor ratios kt must
also be positive. Consequently, it follows from (32) that bt can only become infinitely large
if Sf and thus Wt both become infinitely large.
n
Using these observations, together with the producer optimization condition (5), it must
hold for each < > 1 that
(51) 0 < ^ ^ = /(^()/^/~/'(^O •
By conditions (4) and (5), and the production function restrictions given in Section 2 (foot
note 5), for Wt to become infinitely large as t approaches infinity, the interest rate rt must
approach zero and the capital-labor ratio kt must become infinitely large as t approaches in>
finity. Consequently, by strict concavity of the production function /(•), and the assumption
that f'{k) approaches zero as k approaches infinity, the average product of capital f{kt)/kt
must approach zero as t approaches infinity, implying from relation (51) that the ratio St/kt
also approaches zero as t approaches infinity.
Finally, it follows from (32) and previous observations that
(52) 1 Ti kifki^i = > 0
for each <> 1. Since Si^ilk{-i approaches zero as t approaches infinity, the (positive) term
1 + n]ktlkt-\ must also approach zero as t approaches infinity in order to have the right
term remain nonnegative for.all t'J Consequently, kt < for all sufficiently large t. But
this contradicts the fact, established above, that kt becomes infinitely large as t approaches
infinity. -. ,
It follows that no equilibrium! consumption loan sequence (6^) for the Brokered Economy
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Figure 1: The Tirole Economy
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Figure 2: Phase Diagram for the Tirole Economy
